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THE NEWEST CONFIGURATION OF THE UGLY AMERICAN: A
RESPONSE TO MR. FEDDERS
Edward J. BOYLE * and Jonathan C. THAU **
1. Introduction
Mr. Fedders and his co-authors correctly note that unscrupulous persons
occasionally capitalize upon foreign secrecy and blocking laws to circumvent
the federal securities laws. In arguing that the mere act of effecting a securities
transaction in the United States should act as a waiver of applicable foreign
secrecy laws, Mr. Fedders suggests rather drastic reform without convincingly
demonstrating the pervasiveness of the problem. In addition, even if adopted,
his proposals would prove unworkable, and ultimately might harm both the
U.S. economy and existing cooperative relationships with secrecy jurisdictions.
Moreover, the jurisdictional analogy Mr. Fedders offers to support these
proposals is, at best, fatally simplistic. Finally, these proposals implicitly rest
upon the assumption that the U.S. securities laws reflect values morally
superior to those reflected in the laws of other nations - an assumption that is
highly questionable, and that Mr. Fedders does not even attempt to prove.
2. The practical difficulties with Mr. Fedders' proposals
Mr. Fedders observes that there has been a substantial influx of foreign
investment in the U.S. securities markets, and that this trend is likely to
continue. He then discusses several matters in which secrecy or blocking laws
have recently impeded SEC investigations. Based upon this influx of foreign
dollars, and the existence of these several troublesome cases, Mr. Fedders then
concludes that additional measures are necessary to counteract the adverse
effects of foreign secrecy and blocking laws.
Mr. Fedders does not, however, demonstrate the pervasiveness of these
problems. Although secrecy and blocking laws unquestionably may impede
some SEC investigations, Mr. Fedders fails to demonstrate that these occur-
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rences represent the rule rather than the exception. In addition, as Mr. Fedders
seems to concede, U.S. courts already have been reasonably successful in
coping with these problems in ways that do not infringe substantially upon the
sovereignty of other nations. In short, although a problem exists, Mr. Fedders
has failed to demonstrate its severity.
Adopting Mr. Fedders' proposals also may trigger negative side-effects
substantially outweighing any potential benefits. First, as other commentators
have noted [1], foreign investors might withdraw their investments from the
U.S. securities markets, and thus inflict extraordinary damage to the U.S.
economy. Second, Mr. Fedders notes that the SEC and other governmental
entities already have succeeded in negotiating certain cooperative agreements
with Swiss authorities. If the SEC were to attempt unilaterally to strip foreign
investors of protection guaranteed them by the laws of their own nations, this
cooperative relationship, and the accompanying benefits, might disintegrate
rapidly.
Indeed, in a recent article [2], two solicitors from the United Kingdom
observe that the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and the Netherlands all
have adopted measures designed to protect their nationals from attempts to
expand the jurisdictional reach of the U.S. antitrust laws. There is no reason to
believe that these, and other, nations would respond with greater enthusiasm if
the United States were to attempt to expand the territorial reach of its
securities laws.
Finally, as a practical 'matter, the SEC and U.S. courts would find it nearly
impossible to force their will upon foreign persons or entities. Assume, for
example, that the SEC wishes to compel a foreign citizen with a Swiss bank
account to reveal to it information regarding certain securities transactions
apparently effected on his behalf in the United States. Assume further that the
SEC convinces a federal judge that there is reason to believe that the foreign
investor may have traded on inside information. Now suppose that the court is
persuaded by the SEC's argument and, buying Mr. Fedders' "waiver by
conduct" argument, orders the foreign investor to give the SEC all information
concerning these transactions. The SEC's ability to enforce such an ex parte
order is highly questionable.
Even aside from any substantial threshold objections to the court's at-
tempted exercise of in personam jurisdiction, absent the applicability of any
treaty or other negotiated arrangement between Switzerland and the United
States, neither the SEC nor the court will succeed in enforcing this order. The
foreign investor probably would not effect these transactions directly, but more
likely would use a foreign attorney or intermediary, who in turn might utilize
one or more additional attorneys or intermediaries. Any self-interested foreign
attorney would rather risk disapproval of a foreign regulatory body than the
professional opprobium he would bring upon himself if he were to violate
applicable secrecy laws of his own country [3]. Moreover, the foreign investor
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almost certainly will defy such an order. In short, the issuance of such an order
will prove a hollow gesture, and one likely to pffend others.
Like politics, sound jurisprudence is often the art of the possible. In the long
run, convincing courts to issue unenforceable orders will not bring any credit
to the SEC and, rather than expand the SEC's jurisdiction, will only emphasize
its territorial limits.
3. Mr. Fedders' simplistic jurisdictional analogy
In seeking precedent for his proposals, Mr. Fedders devotes a substantial
portion of his article to discussing the manner in which state courts in the
United States formulated rules for asserting jurisdiction over citizens of sister
states, and then suggests applying a similar analysis to relationships between
nations. Although courts and commentators during the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries did refer generally to the sovereignty of particular states, all
states were joined by one federal government, with one federal legislature, one
federal court system, and one constitution. In addition, except for Louisiana,
all states owed their legal heritage to centuries of English experience.
In contrast, the many jurisdictions containing secrecy or blocking laws vary
widely regarding language, culture, and heritage. In addition, these nations are
not linked by any controlling federal government, by any legislature, by any
federal court system, or by any one constitution. In short, the sovereignty of
states within the United States cannot reasonably be analogized to the
sovereignty of nations, and Mr. Fedders' jurisdictional analogy therefore fails.
Finally, Mr. Fedders' jurisdictional analogy focuses on one side of the coin
only. If the SEC or U.S. courts attempt to eviscerate foreign laws or impose
their own rules of conduct upon foreign citizens, these other nations could
retaliate by refusing, when otherwise appropriate, to apply U.S. laws, or by
attempting to expand their own exercise of jurisdiction over U.S. citizens [4].
Although the scope and seriousness of this problem is unclear, at the very least
Mr. Fedders' failure even to discuss this problem suggests a narrowness of
focus and, as discussed in section 4, infra, a presumptuous view that the U.S.
securities laws are intrinsically superior to laws of other nations.
4. Mr. Fedders' unwarranted value assumptions
The practical problems with Mr. Fedders' proposals are compounded by his
unwarranted assumption that policy goals reflected in the federal securities
laws or espoused by the SEC are somehow morally superior to policy goals
reflected by the secrecy and blocking laws of other nations. For example, Mr.
Fedders argues that "no nation should permit itself to be used as a base for
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persons to perpetrate frauds upon their neighbors" [5]. He also speaks of "the
mutual interest in fair and honest securities markets" [6], and refers disparag-
ingly to secrecy jurisdictions that "seek to maintain their special status as
secrecy havens" [7].
Blinded by moralistic fervor, Mr. Fedders fails to recognize that there is no
universally acceptable definition of "fraud" or "fair and honest", and that the
moral basis for his proposals thus is not compelling. Although U.S. citizens
have been conditioned from paperback novels and "B" movies to suspect
something intrinsically evil in any transaction involving a secret bank account,
in fact, as Mr. Fedders himself seems to concede in his Appendix 1, secrecy
jurisdictions have a long tradition, a tradition substantially predating the SEC.
Many wealthy foreigners have employed secret bank accounts for centuries;
such reliance does not necessarily reflect a buried or budding fraud. Accord-
ingly, when Mr. Fedders asks "whether the secrecy laws or blocking statutes of
one nation should be given extraterritorial application" [8], he misses the mark;
it is Mr. Fedders, rather than foreign jurisdictions, who seems eager to export a
value system.
Indeed, although some offenses would seem reprehensible to persons in any
civilized jurisdiction, many violations of the federal securities laws would not
fall within that category. For example, it is hard to see how short-swing
trading, which the federal securities laws proscribe, could be viewed as mnalum
in se. Does Mr. Fedders believe that the SEC should be permitted to eviscerate
long-standing foreign secrecy laws if doing so would help to uncover a
short-swing profit? Similarly, although the SEC requires that parties register
certain securities before offering them for sale, the SEC also permits the
promoter of an offering under certain circumstances to dispense with registra-
tion, thereby presumably acknowledging that one can fairly promote an
offering even without registering it first with a regulatory body. In short, the
federal securities laws hardly reflect the only reasonable way to regulate
securities transactions.
By ignoring the legitimate interests of other nations, Mr. Fedders' proposals
also conflict with principles of international comity, as reflected in Section 40
of the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(1965), which provides:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and
the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a
person, each state is required by international law to consider, in good faith,
moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such
factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement
actions would impose upon the person,
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(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of
the other state,
(d) the nationality of the persons, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be
expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
In focusing exclusively upon the interests of the United States - or, more
accurately, upon what he perceives these interests to be - Mr. Fedders ignores
totally the " vital national interests" of other nations, and his proposals thus
violate principles of comity [9].
Finally, Mr. Fedders argues that adopting his proposals "is also in the
interest of the" many foreign investors who participate in the United States
markets" [10]. If foreign investors really were wary of the integrity of the U.S.
securities markets, they presumably would not be increasing their investments
in these markets at the rate discussed by Mr. Fedders.
In any event, it is presumptuous for Mr. Fedders to suggest where the
interests of foreign investors truly lie. If lie is correct in suggesting that
investors from secrecy jurisdictions would benefit from laws similar to the
federal securities laws, these jurisdictions presumably will take appropriate
steps to enact similar laws. Absent such steps, however, the United States has
no legitimate basis for imposing on other nations its view of the proper shape
of securities regulation.
Indeed, notwithstanding anything that Mr. Fedders, the SEC, or any
commentators might say, the SEC will not be able to export U.S. securities
laws to other nations unless it can convince these other nations that they have
an independent interest in adopting similar laws. If the SEC truly wishes to
overcome foreign secrecy or blocking laws, it will do so more effectively
through negotiation and persuasion than through attempting unilaterally to
impose its will on other nations through unenforceable legislative or judicial
fiat.
5. Conclusion
The problems described by Mr. Fedders cannot be solved realistically
through the unilateral adoption of his "waiver by conduct" proposals. These
proposals, which conflict with principles of international law and comity
between nations, would prove unenforceable, and might diminish foreign
investment in the United States. In addition, adoption of these proposals
would lead to the erosion, if not the elimination, of whatever cooperative
relationships now exist between the United States and secrecy jurisdictions.
Indeed, after considering Mr. Fedders' proposals, one is impressed less by
them than by the resourcefulness that U.S. courts already have demonstrated
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in dealing with the problems triggered by secrecy and blocking laws. In short,
continued reliance upon creative, case-by-case solutions and upon cooperation
between the United States and secrecy jurisdictions ultimately offers the best
course in combatting these problems.
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